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population. The country now has an IMF program. The paper asks three questions of 
the program: is it too tight? Is the balance of payment’s target appropriate? How will 
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problems and argues that an appropriately structured and expanded fiscal policy is 
needed, together with burden sharing between Iceland and the international 
community.  
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THE IMF, THE CREDIT CRUNCH AND ICELAND:  
A NEW FISCAL SAGA? 
 
 
 
Then the lady Spes said: "It may be that foolish men will follow the example of our 
former lives. Let us now end in such way that we may be an example to the good.”         
       The Saga of Grettir the Strong 
 
 
  
 In October 2008, Iceland experienced a devastating series of problems that 
culminated in the collapse of its currency – the króna. The IMF responded with a 
program that took effect in November, 2008. The primary objective of the program 
was to put a floor under the króna, while laying the groundwork for adjustments that 
would enable Iceland to regain access to the international financial markets. This 
program is of interest for several reasons: it involves the first advanced economy to 
have sought IMF assistance after several decades; it is a program with an economy 
fully integrated into the world of globalized finance; it is a precursor for programs 
with similarly placed countries that were advantaged by financial globalization but are 
now experiencing the effects of the global credit crunch; and, not least, it portrays 
sharply a fundamental fault line of the present international financial setup. 
 Countries need a certain amount of adjustment to correct for past imbalances 
that become unsustainable and to address new contingencies. Adjustment is usually 
burdensome, especially if compressed over a short interval, but with access to 
adequate reserves and international credits can be made more tolerable. However, in 
the case of Iceland, the population is not only experiencing severe erosion in real 
incomes from the outset, but they will have to cope with a potentially huge transfer 
problem arising from the country’s assumption of some of the liabilities of its failed 
banks. This paper asks: can the program’s objectives, assuming they are appropriate, 
be achieved without burdening the population excessively? Developing an answer 
requires addressing at least two aspects. First, some details of the program need to be 
examined, especially with regard to its financial content. In particular, is the program 
too tight? A fundamental problem is that several of the measures taken address a stock 
problem – the shutout from international financial markets, the flight of capital and 
the maturity mismatch of balance sheets and loss of net worths, but bear severe 
consequences for flow activities such as earning and spending income. Can some 
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safeguards be provided to stem the erosion in real incomes, while working out the 
needed balance sheet adjustments? The contention here is that some protection that 
does not unduly compromise reasonable balance of payments targets might be 
feasible through an expanded role for fiscal policy that goes beyond simply letting 
automatic stabilizers operate. However, this is unlikely to be adequate, which brings 
us to the second aspect: given the potential enormity of the transfer problem, some 
relief may also be needed from the debt overhang, once it has been properly assessed 
and allowance made for asset recoveries. Against the backdrop of financial 
globalization and its much touted benefits, what should be the dividing line between 
the burdens to be borne by a participant country and by the international community 
when a global credit crunch strikes?  
 The next section reviews the dimensions of Iceland’s potential payment 
problems, and the factors that made her so vulnerable to the global credit crunch. 
Section 3 examines Iceland’s program with the IMF, and its implications for income 
preservation and balance sheet recovery. Some of these are found to be problematic, 
and Section 4 discusses policy adjustments that may be needed to address them. The 
concluding section takes up the issue of burden sharing in a globalized context. 
 
2. Iceland’s crisis: how big and why? 
 The crisis was triggered when the three major banks were unable to refinance 
their credits in the international money markets, especially following the failure of 
Lehman Brothers. This was a culmination in the growing loss of faith by foreign 
investors in the country’s international banks, and in the value of her currency - the 
króna.2Their perceptions were fed by the increasingly poor looking fundamentals of 
Iceland such as a large current account deficit (Table 1) in a context of deteriorating 
international money market conditions. Taking fright, investors initiated a massive 
withdrawal of funds from Icelandic institutions. The Icelandic stock exchange 
collapsed, and the international reserves of the Central Bank were rapidly depleted in 
a vain attempt to restrain the precipitous decline of the exchange rate.3 The exchange 
rate underwent a sustained depreciation from around ISK 62 to the US dollar at the 
beginning of 2008, a level around it which it had fluctuated for several years, to ISK 
                                                 
2 See IMF (2008) for a concise synopsis. 
3 These defensive maneuvers were not helped by a confused interest policy, which at the height of the 
crisis involved reducing central rates by 3 percentage points. 
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91 by September, reaching ISK 150 in November. In the end the authorities had no 
other recourse but to introduce foreign exchange controls and seek the protective 
umbrella of the IMF. 
 The scale of the problem encountered by the authorities following the shutout 
from external financing is brought out by Table 2, reproduced from the IMF Staff 
Report. A contentious issue that had to be faced was how much of the external 
liabilities of the failed Icelandic banks should be assumed by the Government of 
Iceland. The authorities were in no position to assume their full liabilities, which 
amounted to some ten times of GDP. Nor could they avoid any responsibility, a 
position which might have appeared appealing given the lack of liquid resources. If 
they did nothing, Iceland faced the prospect of disruptive shutouts from international 
markets, including the prospect of asset seizures.  
 With the assistance of the IMF, a strategy for quickly coping with the crisis 
was worked out whereby Iceland assumed those liabilities that appeared inescapable 
such as covering deposit insurance payouts, while postponing a resolution of the 
remaining liabilities. The assumed liabilities were substantial, with projected 
amortization requirements for 2008 of US$18.3 billion, or nearly twice GDP (Table 2). 
Having depleted its international reserves, the program provided for Iceland to set 
aside US$ 3 billion for replenishing reserves. Taking account of the projected current 
account deficit of US$ 1.8 billion, the total gross funding requirements for 2008 thus 
amounted to US$ 23.1 billions. 
  These are huge bills to have been presented all at once, and far outstripped 
available financing resources of only US$ 1.2 billions. The resulting financing gap of 
US$ 21.9 billion for 2008 amounted to some four times exports. The strategy that was 
worked out for meeting this gap involved the authorized accumulation of arrears of 
US$ 10.3 billion, so-called extraordinary financing of US$ 11.2 billion, of which the 
IMF would provide US$ 0.8 billion with earmarked bilateral funding for settling some 
of the liabilities in specific countries accounting for much of the remainder, and a 
residual financing gap of US$ 2.2 billion.  
 Underlying the proximate causes of the crisis were major structural flaws and 
macro policy errors, to which could be added regulatory inexperience and the blind 
pursuit of profit in a crony environment (on the latter see especially Gylfason, 2008, 
and Danielsson and Zoega, 2009). Iceland adopted the wrong banking model, which 
undermined the structural foundations (Buiter and Siebert, 2008). Following the 
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privatization of Iceland’s banking system in 2002/3, the major domestic banks had 
undergone a transformation from simple depository institutions to fully fledged 
international banks engaged in cross-border intermediation on a massive scale.4 The 
banks aggressively attracted deposits and funding from foreign sources and paid 
attractive interest rates. These funds were on lent to Icelandic entrepreneurs, both 
those who operated abroad and in the domestic market, and to households. By 
contemporary standards the banks appeared reasonably well capitalized and risk 
perceptions were low. Nonetheless, as Buiter and Siebert (op. cit.) point out the 
central bank of a small open economy with its own currency cannot be an effective 
lender of last resort for its banks should they operate on a scale internationally that far 
exceeds its reserve holdings. There was an accident waiting to happen. 
 On the macro policy side, a major flaw was the adoption of an inflation 
targeting regime in a liberalized small open economy setting, where transactors had 
unfettered access to international finance. The targeted inflation rate was 2.5 percent 
annually, but the boom triggered by the inflow of foreign funds led to the inflation 
rate deviating further and further away from it, reaching 12.7 percent in 2008 (Table 
1). Operating in accordance with the procedures of inflation targeting, interest rates 
were raised on several occasions to dampen inflation. However, their effect, together 
with the added incentives of an appreciating exchange rate, was to attract even more 
foreign funds, which further fueled the boom. At the same time, with high domestic 
interest rates but very low international ones, it became increasingly attractive for 
Icelandic residents to seek low interest foreign currency loans. It is estimated that 
when the crisis hit, four-fifths of corporate debt, and one fifth of household debts were 
foreign currency denominated (IMF, 2008). One should also add to this source of 
vulnerability widespread inflation indexing. 
 The IMF in its surveillance of the Icelandic economy repeatedly expressed 
concern about growing imbalances, and urged the authorities to cool the economy 
down. The authorities did make several attempts to cope with the growing financial 
and macroeconomic imbalances, relying on conventional means such as raising 
interest rates in a liberalized financial context. These were consistent with prevailing 
beliefs in the effectiveness of inflation targeting and the conventional stress testing of 
banks. However, with residents’ growing access to globalized finance, domestic 
                                                 
4 See also Herbertsson (2009). 
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monetary policy began to lose traction. Increasingly, the authorities looked to a 
restrictive fiscal policy, and the budget deficit swung into substantial surplus (Table 
1). The general government’s public debt was sharply reduced, amounting in net 
terms to less than 6 percent of GDP at the beginning of 2008. Sizable international 
reserves were also accumulated, but at one-half of GDP they amounted to only a 
fraction of the external indebtedness of the banks estimated at some ten times of GDP. 
 These fiscal and international reserve bulwarks proved totally inadequate 
when the financial crisis struck in October, 2008. For many Icelandic residents the 
balance sheet implications, especially with regard to their unhedged foreign currency 
liabilities, were devastating. The collapse of the exchange rate added greatly to the 
cost of servicing foreign currency denominated debt. At the same time, deterioration 
in partner country economic conditions, the capital flight and associated economic 
shocks eroded the value of the assets backing these liabilities. The situation became 
one where banks owed vast sums to their foreign creditors; firms owed huge amounts 
to the banks and foreign creditors; and households owed substantial sums to domestic 
and foreign financial institutions, while the asset backing was greatly diminished. 
With imploding finances and eroding net worths, the crisis spread quickly to the real 
economy raising the prospect of widespread defaults.5 
 
3. The IMF program  
 Coping with the crisis and selecting the appropriate recovery path requires 
attending to several issues in the general context of a lack of external financing. The 
way in which the IMF program deals with these issues is examined next. 
  
The program’s content 
 The focus of the program was on addressing immediate contingencies rather 
than attending to underlying causes such as the two main structural and policy ones 
mentioned above. In any case attending to the latter would now be redundant given 
                                                 
5 It is tempting to describe the events leading to Iceland’s collapse as a “Black Swan Phenomenon”. 
However, several economists had earlier commented on the problems that Iceland was potentially 
developing with its bold plunge into international finance, but were not heeded. Perhaps if economists 
had developed more of a consensus on issues such as the appropriateness of the banking model that 
Iceland adopted and the viability of an inflation targeting macro policy for a small open economy with 
its own currency (in a globalized financial setting), greater attention might have been paid. This raises 
an issue of contemporary modes of economic analysis. Could they be too limiting insofar as they 
preclude alternative analyses based on different premises?  
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the collapse of the banks and suspension of inflation targeting. The overriding priority 
of the IMF program was to put a floor under the free falling króna, since this 
threatened a runaway inflation and dislocation. Stabilizing the króna was also urgently 
needed to stop a further deterioration in balance sheets and widespread defaults. A 
very tight monetary policy was introduced to promote these objectives, with interest 
rates raised by 6 percentage points in one go to 18 percent. The program also 
specified restraint on credit flows through the domestic banking system. However, it 
was recognized that these steps might not be enough to stem the outflow of capital 
and reduce the foreign exchange gap, and the IMF endorsed the suspension of foreign 
exchange transactions via a temporary imposition of foreign exchange controls.  
 A key priority was addressing the issue of Iceland’s external debt. Iceland 
lacked the means to help her banks overcome their shortage of foreign exchange to 
settle their outstanding foreign liabilities. The solution adopted was for the authorities 
to directly assume some of these liabilities, and to split up the banks into two groups. 
One group would maintain essential domestic banking functions, while the other 
group would take over the remaining external liabilities. A reason given for this split 
was to limit the “socialization” of losses of the collapsed banks. While accepting 
certain contractual obligations such as honoring insured foreign deposits, the 
authorities left to one side the issue of foreign loans contracted by the banks, pending 
the determination of their true levels together with a proper valuation of the offsetting 
assets held by the banks. 
 Nonetheless, the external debt problem is ticking and will need to be 
satisfactorily resolved if Iceland is to regain full access to the international financial 
markets. The extent to which the authorities will accept additional liabilities arising 
from the debt settlement process is uncertain at this stage. It will probably depend on 
the international assistance they receive, especially through the agency of the IMF, the 
strength of creditor resistance and the sanctions they could apply, and not least 
domestic taxpayer acceptance of additional burdens. The last in particular is critical 
for the sustainability of any recovery path, but is also likely to prove most contentious 
given the extent to which private incomes and balance sheets have been adversely 
impacted by the shocks. 
 A third program objective is to initiate banking reforms, especially of a 
regulatory nature, that would facilitate a banking system that is more securely 
integrated with international markets. However, for the time being, the authorities 
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have effectively abandoned their globalized banking model, reverting instead to the 
older depositary institution style of banking that had served them well in the past. 
 The bank related actions taken so far have imposed a big fiscal cost on the 
government. On the one hand, additional debt was incurred from honoring the insured 
foreign deposit liabilities (47 percent of GDP), from the recapitalization of the central 
bank as a consequence of the exchange rate losses encountered (10 percent of GDP), 
and from the capitalization of the new banks (26 percent of GDP). Together these will 
increase the public debt by about 83 percent of GDP. This is in gross terms and the 
IMF staff estimates that there is some scope for eventually recovering part of the cost 
through asset recoveries. On the other hand, the budget will have to pick up the 
recurrent costs of servicing the additional debt acquired. These are estimated to 
amount to some 5 percent of GDP in 2009, adding to the fiscal deterioration from the 
economic decline. Unlike the programs that the IMF negotiated with the Asian crisis 
countries a decade ago, and which were heavily criticized for suppressing automatic 
fiscal stabilizers, the Icelandic program allows full rein to the automatic stabilizers. 
Together with the new debt service charges, the overall fiscal deficit for 2009 is 
projected at 13.5 percent of GDP. 
 Deficits of this magnitude are not sustainable over the longer term, and an 
objective of the program is to initiate reforms of the public finances that are to be 
implemented starting in 2010. A problem is that of how costs associated with the 
vastly increased public debt, which will increase further depending on the resolution 
of the remaining external liabilities, are to be handled. In addition to the fiscal issue of 
providing the debt servicing resources, Keynes’s transfer problem of converting them 
into foreign exchange is raised. In Keynes (1929) view a budget surplus would not 
automatically convert into an export surplus unless the conditions were right such as 
having a wide range of attractively priced export goods, which Iceland lacks.  
 If Iceland’s unrequited external liabilities could have been refinanced, the 
adjustment burden for residents would have been greatly reduced, and more time 
would have been obtained for working down the external liabilities to prudent levels. 
However, refinancing in the current global credit crunch is difficult, including from 
the IMF, which only has limited resources to provide. Hence, the more burdensome 
solution of generating a current account surplus of the balance of payments will have 
to be relied upon to work down the external liabilities. The IMF’s financial program 
promotes this through regulation of domestic credit flows. 
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How tight is the IMF’s financial program? 
The issue here is whether the program itself is too tight and contractionary, 
which could impose an excessive burden on the Icelandic population. Much of the 
problem being experienced in Iceland has to do with asset side phenomena triggered 
by capital flight, to which the response has been massive exchange rate depreciation 
and interest rate jumps. The latter two are inherently deflationary since they raise 
price levels, erode cash flows through higher debt service charges, wreak damage on 
balance sheets and, absent default, require further diversion from cash flow to repair 
them. The balance sheet shocks and the associated price adjustments go well beyond 
requirements for restoring balance in income and expenditure flows. For example, 
IMF staff had earlier estimated that the exchange rate, measured on a trade-weighted 
basis, was some 15-20 percent overvalued. An exchange rate correction of this 
magnitude, to some ISK 75 to the dollar from ISK 62, would result in some real 
income erosion and import reduction. However, the actual overshooting of the 
exchange rate is much greater. This is not likely to boost export production, which is 
concentrated in relatively unresponsive aluminum and fish products.6 Despite a highly 
depreciated reference exchange rate, the program projections indicate a decline of 15 
percent in the dollar value of 2009 exports over 2008 as a result of adverse global 
conditions. 
On the export side, the main outcome of the exchange rate overshooting is to 
generate substantial exchange rate related windfalls. In local currency terms, projected 
merchandise exports for 2009 would amount to ISK 735 billion if the exchange rate of 
ISK 150 to the US dollar is used as against some ISK 367, or one-half, using the trade 
corrected overvaluation of the exchange rate. This gives an idea of the scale of the 
windfalls on export earnings. On the import side, given the smallness of the economy 
and the limited scope for domestic substitution, the overshooting would induce a jump 
in local currency import prices, which will function as a big tax on consumption. The 
resulting real income erosion, which would also be affected by unemployment, will 
compress imports by a greater amount than from removing the trade related 
overvaluation of the currency. Extreme import compression together with exchange 
rate overshooting is likely in a deflationary context to induce expectations of a 
                                                 
6 Keynes, ibid, illustrates the difficulty of addressing the transfer problem using the then contemporary 
example of Russia and its dependence on “caviare and platinum”, analogous to that of Iceland today 
with its dependence on fish and aluminum exports. 
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subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate. Combining such expectations with 
sharply higher interest rates should overcome heightened risk perceptions, which 
would help stem capital outflows and might even attract funds, which is a strategy 
that the IMF program is relying upon.  
Increases in private saving of a precautionary nature associated with the 
greater uncertainties regarding the immediate period ahead would reinforce the 
contractionary effects of the shocks to private sector balance sheets. On the other hand, 
the public finances are expected to deteriorate substantially owing to the operation of 
automatic stabilizers and the cost of servicing the newly acquired debt. The program 
projections imply that this would be offset by the private sector’s improvement in net 
savings, since the current account of the balance of payments is expected to swing 
from a large deficit to a small surplus. However, the improvement in the latter could 
be larger, both from underestimating the decline in investment and the increase in 
savings. For example, domestic savings could be further boosted if export related 
windfalls are invested in domestic financial instruments on which they could earn 
annual returns of 18 percent. 
Insofar as the increased savings demand from various sources takes the form 
of deposits, the likelihood for which increases in a period of volatility and greater 
uncertainty, the money supply increases and velocity declines. However, the program 
projects an increase in the velocity of circulation of broad money, reversing a 
declining trend for several years (Table 3). This is contrary to widespread experience 
with Fund programs, which tend to show a decline in velocity (Baqir et. al, 2005). 
With nominal GDP projected to remain unchanged, the program’s assumption for 
velocity reduces the incremental demand for money by 4.4 percent. Hence, even 
though the net foreign asset position of the monetary sector is targeted to fall by ISK 
222 billions, the permissible amount of domestic credit creation for 2009 is limited to 
an increase of ISK127 billion (Table 4). Of this amount ISK 100 billion is assigned to 
government. On taking account of the allocation to the category “other items net”, the 
private sector ends up with having to retire credit of about ISK 105 billion instead of 
receiving additional credit to help them cope with their cash flow constraints.7 If 
                                                 
7 Such calculations in the IMF are based on a fundamental monetary equation that involves equating 
the demand for money to its supply. The latter is determined by domestic credit operations and net 
international reserve movements. Imposing a target on the last determines the amount of domestic 
credit creation for a given projection of the demand for money projection. Thus the balance of 
payments targets and the assumptions underlying the demand for money projections are critical. 
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instead, velocity were to be assumed unchanged at its previous year’s level, which is 
still a conservative assumption in light of experience elsewhere, credit could be 
expanded by a further ISK 85 billion. 
 The credit availability implications for the private sector are stringent. Leaving 
aside the use of credit to smooth the adjustment to a much worse balance sheet, the 
sharp exchange rate related increases in cost of inputs and the cost of servicing debt 
will have increased credit requirements for many firms. Many firms and households 
are also likely to have experienced erosion in their cash flows and would have 
difficulty in paying back the credit they have utilized. This causes a credit freeze, 
which is aggravated by the projected absolute reduction in the stock of credit to the 
private sector under the program ceilings.  
 A critical element in projecting the demand for money, in addition to velocity, 
is nominal GDP. This is assumed to be virtually unchanged in 2009. Although the 
IMF staff report does not explain why, some inferences can be drawn on considering 
the projected behaviour of the inflation and real growth components. According to 
Table 1 the annual inflation rate jumps from 5 percent in 2007 to a projected 12.7 
percent in 2008, while the annual average exchange rate with respect to the US dollar 
depreciates by some 38 percent. For 2009, the program assumes an exchange rate of 
113.9 for projection purposes. Assuming that this is realized, the period depreciation 
would amount to nearly 30 percent over 2008. The period inflation rate is projected to 
be about 14.3 percent, declining to 4.5 percent at year end. This would suggest that all 
other sources of inflation would be fully restrained, and that the exchange rate would 
reverse some of its overshooting in the course of the year. However, the risks are on 
the downside and it is quite likely that both the period and end-year inflation rates for 
2009 could be higher. Nonetheless, the projected inflation rates appear acceptable as a 
working hypothesis. 
 Real GDP growth is projected to fall by 9.6 percent in 2009, which 
corresponds to experiences of several countries experiencing capital stops such as the 
Asian crisis countries. While experience with the so-called capital crisis countries of 
the mid- late 1990s pointed to declines of the order of 10 percent of GDP, these were 
not anticipated; otherwise actions would surely have been taken to forestall them. For 
example, more strenuous efforts could have been made to mobilize additional funds, 
failing which capital controls could have been introduced early and less 
contractionary demand management policies pursued. In the absence of information 
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in the Staff report, one would have to speculate as to the factors underlying the 
projected fall in GDP. Exports, which account for about one-half of GDP, are 
expected to show a small increase in volume terms. The government sector appears to 
be relatively unscathed. Value-added in the construction and import processing and 
retailing sectors would be adversely impacted. The share of gross domestic 
investment in GDP is projected to fall by 5.7 percentage points between 2008 and 
2009. One could add a couple of percentage points to account for the shrinking of the 
import sector, with some offset provided by a limited amount of potential domestic 
import substitution. However, despite these contractionary factors it should be 
possible through appropriate demand management policies to contain the GDP fall to 
say, 5 percent, which would be more bearable. 
  The above considerations suggest that growth in nominal 2009 GDP of 
around 10 percent (15 percent inflation less 5 percent real contraction) might be a 
more reasonable projection/target to aim at than the program assumption of only 0.3 
percent growth in nominal GDP. Using the higher figure in the incremental demand 
for money calculation implies a further increase in the permissible amount of credit of 
about ISK 200 billion. Taken together with the revised velocity assumption, a total of 
ISK 285 billion of additional domestic credit could be provided. Instead of a reduction 
of credit of ISK 105 billion to the private sector, an increase of ISK 180 billion would 
thus be possible, consistent with the program’s net foreign asset target as specified in 
Table 4.  
 
How appropriate are the balance of payments targets? 
 The overall balance of payments is projected to decline by US$ 2 billions in 
2009. This is entirely due to capital account developments involving some further 
amortization of previously contracted debt. It is difficult to assess the capital account 
projections except to note that they are not fully spelt out so as not to compromise 
ongoing discussions with creditors. With respect to the current account, a turnaround 
is projected from a deficit of US$ 1.8 billion in 2008 to a small surplus of US$ 0.1 
billion. Given a 12 percent projected deterioration in exports of goods and services, 
the improvement is attributable to a reduction in imports of goods and services of 
some 27 percent.  
 Although considerable uncertainty surrounds these projections/targets, the 
current account target appears relatively unambitious, taking account of likely 
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developments in saving and investment, and the large luxury good element of imports 
in recent years. The projections appear to be even more modest insofar as debt service 
payments on so-called extraordinary financing of the balance of payments (excluding 
the Fund but inclusive of arrears and bilateral financing) are excluded, even though 
they are included in the budget. However, these debt service payments are included in 
the capital account, which raises the presumption that they may end up being 
capitalized and added to debt. In principle, the amount of improvement to be sought in 
the current account should depend on the net size of the external obligations that will 
need to be amortized and the scope for parallel funding operations. The bigger the 
current account surplus the more serious the commitment to amortization will appear, 
which should facilitate refunding. 
 Nonetheless, given the contractionary balance sheet effects and the stringent 
allocation of credit to the private sector, it is likely that import compression will be 
greater than projected, resulting in a bigger current account surplus and more scope 
for amortization. The experience of the Asian crisis countries suggests that current 
account surpluses amounting to some 10 percent of GDP may not be unrealistic, 
owing to balance sheet shocks and program tightness. But this does not necessarily 
imply that such large current account adjustments are desirable. The best outcome 
would have been for a reversal of the balance sheet shocks, for example through a 
recovery of asset values, or access to substantial refunding. Taxpayers, after meeting 
their burdens, would not then have to confront major additional burdens for bailing 
out banks because their assets no longer suffice to service their liabilities. 
 
4. An expanded role for fiscal policy 
 Although the monetary program appears too tight, this is apparently not the 
case with fiscal policy. However, simply relaxing monetary stringency by allowing 
more credit to the private sector may not be adequate if it does not result in their being 
utilized. Banks, taking note of the erosion in private sector balance sheets and reduced 
earnings prospects, at any rate outside the export sector, will be reluctant to lend and 
risk further losses. They would rather purchase government paper, but if this is not 
available at attractive prices they would simply retain non-income earning liquidity.  
 On the other hand, even if banks were willing to increase loans, the private 
sector may be reluctant to take on much additional debt, so long as they face the 
prospect of diminished earnings and severely eroded asset values. They would, of 
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course, wish to have their existing credits renewed and increased to reflect their 
higher costs of business, but not for the purpose of undertaking major new 
investments. Instead they would tend to emphasize debt consolidation and the 
reduction of amortization requirements to improve their balance sheets, while 
lowering other debt related costs to ease their cash flows. 
 There is thus scope for increased dysfunctionality of the credit markets both 
from the side of banks and borrowers. Banks may wish to lend towards new, low risk, 
profitable projects, while the private sector would like to borrow just to survive until 
business picks up. Increasing the scope for lending to the private sector may not lead 
to its being utilized, which provides a role for fiscal interventions. 
 But to what extent can the fiscal deficit be further increased from its present 
high projected level? The debt restructuring charges on the budget and the operation 
of the automatic stabilizers, while increasing the budget deficit sharply, are not 
viewed as inflationary, given the projected increase in net private savings. In a longer- 
run horizon such deficits would not be sustainable, even taking note of a probable 
future decline in interest rates to more normal levels. However, to the extent that 
private savings are higher than projected for the reasons noted earlier, there would be 
room in the short-run for further non-inflationary increases in the fiscal deficit. This 
would enable fiscal policy to play a more active role, which is important as it could 
help limit the contraction in the economy to a more bearable level of, say, 5 percent. 
A more modest contraction would reduce the effect of automatic stabilizers thereby 
restraining the increase in the overall fiscal deficit. However, rather than simply 
expand the fiscal deficit by the amount of additional, non-inflationary credit that 
could be created, it might be prudent to meet part of the direct costs of the fiscal 
interventions through higher taxes on windfalls. Such taxes might forestall possible 
capital outflow from this source that would otherwise reduce available domestic 
savings for financing the deficit. 
 There are several things that the government could do with increased access to 
credit and/or higher tax revenues. For example, it could undertake infrastructural 
investments that would help the construction sector. It could provide assistance to 
home-owners and businesses to help them meet their debt related payments, either 
directly, or in the form of tax reliefs. It could help with the renewal of private sector 
credit lines by providing guarantees thereby restraining foreclosures and forced asset 
sales that would further damage balance sheets.  
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 In addition to helping stave off a collapse in demand, and providing a helping 
hand to troubled sectors, fiscal policy could play an important role in addressing some 
of the adverse distributional consequences of the shocks and of the IMF program. The 
most obvious candidate would be the sharp rise in import costs of necessities such as 
food, fuel and medicine that would hit the poorer income groups. This is a specific 
example of the more general maldistribution of income between export earners and 
the rest of the economy. Once again, exchange rate related subsidies paid out could be 
financed through a special tax on export related windfalls. 
 
5. Conclusion: spreading the burden equitably 
 The paper has argued that there is scope through a more active fiscal policy for 
reducing the burden of adjustment on the Icelandic population for the given set of 
program objectives. However, more is needed, for even with optimal fine tuning 
under the program, an enormous burden of adjustment will fall on the shoulders of the 
population. It has been estimated that external debt liabilities, much of which have 
now been frozen, amount to some US$ 250,000 per inhabitant. Given a per capita 
income of around US$ 30,000, if the full liability is placed on their shoulders, the 
debt-service burden, even with stretched out payment terms, could consume more 
than one-third of per capita income. This is a huge transfer problem by any standard. 
It would also come on top of declining net worths, increased debt service obligations 
and eroded cash flows that many residents are encountering. If effected, it will lead to 
a dramatic decline in the standard of living, plunging most of the population into 
poverty. To the extent possible such an outcome should be avoided. 
 Addressing the transfer burden raises an issue of broader significance. How 
much of an adjustment burden should the local population endure when they are 
victims of shocks over which they have little control, owing to their acceptance and 
participation in the globalized financial commons? No doubt a handful of Icelandic 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the opportunities provided by a sustained period of 
extraordinarily low interest rates in the liberal globalized financial environment. They 
were not as well regulated as they should have been, and there are allegations of 
collusion with some politicians. Nonetheless, they fell afoul of a situation created by 
factors beyond their control such as excessively low interest rates in the US followed 
by the inevitable credit crunch, which was made worse by a mountain of toxic debt 
that compromised the global credit markets. These entrepreneurs played the game that 
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financial globalization encourages, but then crashed when they ran out of refinancing 
options. Insofar as they engaged in excesses, they should pay the price. But to what 
extent should their internationally related problems, and individual greed, which 
ultimately reflect the impotence of national regulation in a globalized environment in 
the face of inadequate global regulation, be visited on the entire Icelandic population?  
 At heart is an issue of fairness. Should the entire population be subject to a 
form of collective punishment for the deeds of a few? Most civilized societies limit 
punishment to the perpetrator of the deed, even when the stakes involved are very 
high, and even though others may have benefited indirectly. In the recent Madoff 
scandal, for example, it is alleged that more than US$ 50,000 billion was improperly 
disposed off, but only Mr. Madoff is liable to be punished, not his extended family 
despite benefitting from his deeds unless they were consenting accomplices. It could 
be argued that limiting liability in this manner is appropriate within nation states, but 
not across borders, where liabilities are often incurred by and between sovereigns. 
However, underlying this argument is the assumption that the sovereign is in control. 
But the public good nature of the current international financial setup requires that the 
sovereign cede control, in this instance to global financial markets. Domestic and 
foreign residents are strongly encouraged to participate in such markets; indeed a 
country would be stigmatized if it imposed capital controls or took other steps to 
disengage in an attempt to better control its destiny. But who regulates the global 
financial commons? Iceland could argue that its banks and entrepreneurs were simply 
following the global rules of the game, and became unstuck just as did many other 
transactors around the world.    
 The general consensus among the prime movers of the international financial 
setup as to the desirability of unfettered globalization raises issues of political 
economy. Little attention, for example, was paid to the broader risks associated with 
the country operating the wrong banking model. As late as August 2007, the IMF’s 
Board of Directors indicated during their surveillance of the Iceland economy that 
they were “encouraged by the outcome of stress tests suggesting that banks had 
adequate capital to withstand extreme credit and market shocks” (IMF, 2007). 
Overriding importance was attached to maintaining and promoting open financial 
markets internationally, relying on various financial hedging instruments and the self-
regulation of markets, and only to a lesser extent on international surveillance through 
agencies such as the IMF. But should the interests of a few dominant players, who 
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benefit most from unfettered globalization – Simon Johnson (2009), a prominent ex 
chief economist of the IMF has referred to them as “financial oligarchs” akin to the 
notorious Russian ones - be placed above those of the many? Countries are advised 
and indeed cajoled to open their financial markets on the grounds that they would 
benefit greatly from the free flow of finance, especially of the portfolio variety. 
However, when a “sudden stop” occurs and capital flows out, it is the small player 
that confronts most of the burden of adjustment as was witnessed with the Asian crisis 
countries. When should a failure of the global financial system lead to a collective 
adjustment burden for the population of an affected country, and when for the wider 
international community? Can and should not an international burden sharing 
agreement be introduced that spreads the adjustment costs more widely? Answers to 
the questions raised here are urgently needed as many more countries could end up 
with fates similar to Iceland’s. 
 The underlying issue of who bears responsibility for what exposes a 
fundamental fault line in the present international financial setup. Aside from better 
international regulation that complements and strengthens domestic regulatory 
capacities, an adequate international insurance scheme, if not lender of last resort, is 
needed. The latter should go beyond simply loaning limited and conditional funds in 
support of adjustment strategies, but with the entire burden of adjustment placed on 
the recipient. This might have been appropriate in a traditional setting where a country 
experiences a payments problem because it willfully spent beyond its means. In the 
contemporary world of globalized finance and multiple currencies, more centralized 
coordination and restraining influences will have to be exercised. Fortunately, this 
appears now to be increasingly accepted.  
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Table 1 Iceland: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 2003-2009 
 
 
 
 
percent change unless 
otherwise noted 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
2007 
est. 
2008 
Sp 
2009 
Sp 
Real GDP growth  2.4 7.7 7.4 4.4 4.9 1.6 -9.6 
Unemployment rate (percent 
rate) 
3.4 3.1 2.1 1.3 1.0 1.4 5.7 
Nominal GDP growth  10.4 10.5 13.8 10.7 15.2 0.3 
CPI inflation 2.1 3.2 4.0 6.8 5.0 12.7 14.3 
Nominal wage growth 5.6 4.6 6.5 9.1 9.3 6.7 2.3 
Real disposable income per 
capita 
-1.7 3.8 6.6 -2.0 5.4 … … 
Real effective exchange rate 
(+ appreciation) 
6.3 2.8 12.7 -6.8 5.7 … … 
Nominal effective exchange 
rate (+appreciation) 
6.2 1.8 10.4 -10.7 2.8 … … 
US$ rate (period average) 76.8 70.1 62.9 69.8 64 88.1 113.9 
        
in percent of GDP        
Current account of the 
balance of payments 
-4.8 -9.8 -16.1 -25.4 -14.6 -10.7 1.0 
Fiscal Balance -2.8 -1.5 -0.5 6.3 5.5 -0.2 -13.5 
revenue 44.6 45.9 48.8 49.7 50.0 45.3 41.7 
expenditure 47.5 45.9 44.0 43.4 44.5 45.5 55.2 
 
 Sources: Sedlabanki Islands, IMF (2008); Sp=IMF staff projection 
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Table 2      Iceland: External Financing Requirement and Sources, 2008–13 
(In billions of US dollars) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011  2012  2013 
 Proj Proj  Proj  Proj  Proj  Proj 
A.  Gross Requirements  23.1 3.1  4.8  2.3  1.2  0.6 
Current account deficit  1.8 -0.1  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4  -0.4 
Amortization  18.3 3.8  4.5  2.7  1.5  0.9 
Official  0.8 0.5  0.3  2.3  1.1  0.6 
Private other financial and other  17.3 1.0  1.9  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Loans to cover deposit insurance  2.1  2.1    
Short-term debt (end of previous 
year)  
0.2 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Reserves accumulation (+: increase)  3.0 -0.6  0.7  0.1  0.1  0.0 
B.  Sources of Financing  1.2 1.7  4.2  2.4  1.7  1.4 
Foreign Direct Investment (net)  -0.7 0.3  1.4  0.9  1.0  0.7
 FDI outflows Abroad  0.5 0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0
 FDI inflows to Iceland  -1.3 0.3  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.8 
Net inflows of equity and other 
capital  0.4 -1.3  -0.5  -0.1  0.0  0.1 
Asset recovery  2.1  2.1    
New borrowing  4.5 1.7  1.9  1.9  0.7  0.5 
Other net assets  -3.0 -1.0  -0.7  -0.3  0.0  0.1
 C.  Financing Gap (A-B)  21.9 1.4  0.6  0.0  -0.5  -0.8 
Errors and omissions  0.4 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Accumulation of arrears  10.3 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Extraordinary Financing  11.2 1.4  0.6  0.0  -0.5  -0.8 
Fund  0.8 0.6  0.6  0  -0.5  -0.8
 Bilateral (earmarked/ non-cash)  8.2 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
 Residual Financing gap  2.2 0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
     
 Sources: CBI; and IMF (2008) staff estimates. 
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Table 3 Iceland: Money and Velocity, 2003-2009 
    (In billions of Króna) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Sp 
2009 
Sp 
        
Broad Money 484 546 656 785 1231 1649 1576 
Nominal GDP 841 929 1026 1168 1293 1490 1495 
Velocity 1.74 1.70 1.56 1.48 1.05 0.90 0.95 
 
 Sources: IMF (2008) and author’s calculations; Sp=IMF staff projection 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 Iceland: IMF Financial Program, 2009 
    (In billions of Króna) 
        
     
 Consolidated Financial 
System  
Dec-
08 
Mar-
09 
Jun-
09 
Sep-
09 
Dec-
09 
Net foreign assets  -189 -245 -301 -356 -411  
Net domestic assets 
      Net claims on the   
public sector 
      Net credit to private 
sector 
      Other, net  
2,146 
 
-175 
 
2,544 
 -223 
 
2,188 
 
-150  
 
2,517 
-179 
2,215 
 
-125  
 
2,491 
-151 
2,239 
 
-100  
 
2,465 
-126 
2,273  
 
-75  
 
2,439 
-91  
Broad Money (M3)          
      Money and sight 
deposits(M2) 
     Time deposits  
1,649 
 
732 
917  
1,641 
 
729 
912  
1,618 
 
718 
899  
1,592 
 
707 
885  
1,576  
 
700 
876  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Sources: IMF (2008) 
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